Law Blogs Maastricht

This explainer provides essential context on the ICJ’s advisory opinion request on Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The hearings, scheduled from Monday, 28 April 2025 to 2 May 2025, will be live-streamed at the Law Café of the Faculty of Law, Maastricht University.

As part of the ‘AI & Marine Environmental Policy: What Role for Automated Systems?’ research project, a sensemaking workshop took place at Maastricht University’s Faculty of Law on March 28, 2025.

Law increasingly addresses complex scientific and technological developments, and Science and Technology Studies (STS) is gradually making its way into legal scholarship. The strength of STS lies in its capacity to debunk abstract regulatory constructions and force law to confront questions of (in)equality and (in)justice. At its core, STS approaches share a commitment to understanding science and technology not merely as technoscientific phenomena but as socially embedded, interrelated, and constructed.

Not every effort triggers a successful outcome. Academic efforts are no exception, and endeavours may fail because of different reasons and at different stages. Failure should be considered a learning experience both for those who attempted to succeed and for those who might attempt in the future. Academic efforts should not always be considered success stories, yet they should always be considered tools for change and for the advancement of legal science.

This blog was originally published on the European Law Blog on 13 March 2025.

On 11 February 2025, the Commission announced the withdrawal of the 2017 Proposal to reform the Comitology Regulation. The reasons for the withdrawal are rather succinct: ‘[n]o foreseeable agreement – the Proposal is blocked and further progress is unlikely’. Branded by the Commission as a ‘new push for European democracy’, the proposal had arguably much more to do with the Commission’s desire to shift the political blame for controversial decisions it would adopt, rather than with a genuine interest in enhancing legitimacy of comitology-based decision-making. Although fundamental design flaws affecting EU executive rulemaking post-Lisbon warrant change, the Commission’s attempt by means of a half-hearted proposal was insufficient to address at least two fundamental problems of constitutional significance. In this blogpost, we argue that the rationale of the EU’s institutional design and the normative centrality of the principle of democracy should serve as the basis for a reform of comitology, reinvolving the EU legislature in politically sensitive cases and boosting participation and transparency through new procedural rules.